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Abstract: Orwell's famous fictions, Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four criticized 
totalitarian forms of socialism from a Public Choice perspective, assuming that socialism would 
work as an economic system as long as the proper political institutions were in place to curb the 
potential for the abuse of power. This is contrasted with two novels by others who took the 
opposite approach: Richter's Pictures of the Socialistic Future and Hazlitt's Time Will Run Back. 
These two assumed that the political implementation of socialism would be perfect but that 
socialism would necessarily turn totalitarian because of the problem of economic calculation. 
These novels assumed away the Public Choice problem of institutions and the abuse of power 
and focused on the political implications of socialism as a purely economic system. Contrasting 
these two sets of novels shows how the Austrian and Public Choice schools criticize socialism 
in two entirely different ways.
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Perhaps George Orwell's two fictions, Animal Farm (1945) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) need no 
introduction, for they are sometimes assigned as the quintessential refutations of socialism and 
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communism. But in fact, Orwell was an avowed socialist and his two famous fictions could not 
possibly have been intended to controvert socialism. Several recent works have attempted to 
rehabilitate Orwell's status as a socialist and reexamine his famous fictions accordingly.1 Orwell could 
not have meant to condemn socialism per se, but only non-democratic totalitarian forms thereof. He did 
not argue that socialism per se would necessarily fail as an economic system. Instead, his point was 
that socialism would succeed only if political institutions were crafted so as to ensure that those in 
power were suitably incentivized to behave as they ought. His concerns were similar to those of James 
Madison, who saw that government officials cannot be naively trusted as if they were angels, but that 
the political system must be crafted so as to direct them where they ought to go. Otherwise, they would 
abuse their power and establish a despotic oligarchy. Orwell believed that a democratic socialism was 
the solution to the totalitarian potential of socialism. Orwell therefore essentially presaged modern 
Public Choice.
Orwell's message was invaluable especially to fellow socialists who naively assumed that once 
socialism was implemented in any form whatsoever, the right people would automatically rise to the 
top. In apprehending quite early the nature of the Soviet Union, whereas other socialists were either 
starry-eyed dupes or bigoted apologists, Orwell was both critically observant and brutally honest. 
But to appreciate Orwell's criticism of socialism, one should look at a totally different criticism 
of socialism, to see what Orwell did not say. Taking the Public Choice approach, Orwell assumed that 
socialism would work if only the the political institutional protected against the abuse of power. By 
contrast, others made the opposite assumption, assuming away the entire Public Choice problem and 
1 Makovi (2015); Roback (1985); Crothers (1994); White (2008); Newsinger (1999); Harrington 
(1982); Letemendia (1992); Peters (1995); Farrant (2015). The author thanks Christopher Fleming, a 
doctoral candidate in economics at George Mason University for the reference to that undeservedly 
obscure essay by Crothers.
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proposing (if only for the sake of argument) that there would be no problem of abuse of power at all. 
They tried to show that even ignoring the possibility for the abuse of power, socialism would still 
necessarily turn totalitarian anyway due to the inherent economic logic of the system. In this essay, this 
opposing approach will be examined in detail. In particular, we will study the anti-socialist dystopian 
fictions of Eugen Richter and Henry Hazlitt, which argued that the economic logic of socialism meant 
it would necessarily turns totalitarian and tyrannical even assuming the government officials have the 
best of intentions and never abuse their power. Therefore, the fictions of Richter and Hazlitt may be 
understood as the mirror images of Orwell's famous fictions. More generally, this essay will illustrate 
how the Public Choice criticism of socialism's political institutions is the polar opposite of the Austrian 
criticism of the problem of economic calculation under socialism. Once the argument is complete, we 
will suggest a practical classroom exercise involving Socratic dialogue, as a feasible means of bringing 
students to realize this paper's thesis on their own.
I. Orwell as a Public Choice Democratic Socialist
First, we might briefly acquaint ourselves with the nature of Orwell's Public Choice criticism of 
totalitarian socialism and his advocacy for democratic socialism.2 Orwell stated in his “Review of 
Communism and Man by F. J. Sheed” (1939a: 113) that
It is obvious that any economic system would work equitably if men could be trusted to 
behave themselves but long experience has shown that in matters of property only a tiny 
minority of men will behave any better than they are compelled to do.
Thus, Orwell did not criticize socialism as an economic system; instead he criticized only its political 
implementation. His concern was the same as James Madison's, viz. whether the political institutions 
2 The section is only the barest summary of Makovi (2015). The neglected essay by Crothers (1994) 
should be read carefully as well. Makovi (2015) neglects however, to discuss Reilly (1986), 
Fergenson (1990), and Letemendia (1992) – an oversight which this essay will correct shortly.
3
would provide such incentive structures as would prevent the abuse of power. Orwell thought that 
democracy was the solution to this Public Choice problem, as he stated in his “Review of Russia Under 
Soviet Rule by N. de Basily” (1939b: 111):
The essential act is the rejection of democracy - that is, of the underlying values of 
democracy; once you have decided upon that, Stalin - or at any rate something like 
Stalin - is already on the way. (emphasis in original)
In other words, Orwell thought democracy alone was sufficient to solve the Public Choice problem of 
the abuse of power and thereby prevent the emergence of totalitarianism.3 Once that was done, the 
political problems of socialism would be solved and there would be no purely economic problems left 
to be concerned with.
In addition, Orwell thought that classical liberal ideology was a necessary accompaniment to 
proper democratic political institutions. Orwell argued that there was something in the classical-liberal 
English national culture and in Protestantism that served to limit government and promote individual 
freedom (Orwell 1941a, 1944b, 1946b; Newsinger 1999: 72-77). Whereas Public Choice economists 
often neglect the role of ideology in the growth of government and in the use of political power merely 
because ideology cannot be quantitatively analyzed,4 Orwell realized that ideology and national culture 
were perhaps as important as political institutions.5
3 But for an argument that democratic socialism is incoherent and would necessarily fail even without 
the abuse of power, see Makovi (unpublished).
4 Richard Ebeling said this to me in conversation. On wrongly limiting one's studies to quantitative 
data even when non-quantitative data are relevant, see Hayek (1974). On the role of ideology in 
growth of government and its neglect by quantitatively-minded economists, see Higgs (1987).
5 Orwell also realized that perhaps capitalistic economic liberty played a crucial role in promoting 
English freedom, a fact that must have discomfited him as a socialist. See Orwell (1941b, c) and 
Eckstein (1985).
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The plot of Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell 1949) is of course far more intricate and involved 
than that of Animal Farm (Orwell 1946), and there is not enough space here to demonstrate that Public 
Choice concerns underlie the plot of the former. But it is easy enough to show how Public Choice is 
relevant to Animal Farm. Quite simply, the revolution failed because the pigs abused their power and 
betrayed the revolution (Reilly 1986: 77). It was obviously a failure of politicians and political 
institutions, not of socialism as an economic system. Indeed, Orwell tells us about the period before the 
pigs began their betrayal that (Orwell 1945a:16), “With the worthless parasitical human beings gone, 
there was more for everyone to eat. There was more leisure too, inexperienced though the animals 
were.” Socialism was really working successfully and the animals were actually better off than before 
(cf. Reilly 1986: 77). Apparently, if the eponymous Animal Farm had been governed democratically, 
the revolution never would have been betrayed – at least, not according to Orwell – and the story would 
have ended very differently, with the socialist Animal Farm as the most prosperous farm and with the 
highest standard of living for all workers.
Therefore, according to Patrick Reilly (1986)'s reading of Animal Farm, utopian political 
dreams are dashed against the rocks of human (animal) nature. “Utopia slights nature: everything is 
declared possible. … Always in Orwell a sense of the real checks utopian aspirations” (Reilly 1986: 
74). Political revolution 
must take account not only of external factors … but also of the internal dispositions of 
the animals themselves. … Far more important than the external differences between 
Jones and the animals are the ominous internal similarities: the shared irresponsibility, 
selfishness and rapacity, the threat to utopia from within which will survive the ejection 
of Jones or the killing of the Romanovs. (Reilly 1986: 73.)
Similarly, Laraine Fergenson (1990) finds among the lessons of Animal Farm that “any revolution … 
could be corrupted by the less desirable aspects of human nature” (Fergenson 1990: 110) and that 
“[p]ower corrupts” (Fergenson 1990: 113). In other words, Animal Farm, like Public Choice, assumes 
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behavioral and psychological equivalence between private actors in the marketplace and political 
officials. Elevating someone to power is no guarantee that he will become any more public-spirited 
than before. “Democracy cannot overrule nature” (Reilly 1986: 75). 
However, Reilly (1986) and Fergenson (1990) argue that contrary to Orwell's own intentions as 
a democratic socialist revolutionary, Animal Farm demonstrates that any revolution is inexorably 
doomed to fail (cf. Smyer 1971). Against this pessimistic interpretation, V. C. Letemendia comes as a 
corrective, showing from Orwell's own statements about Animal Farm that the message is that 
revolution was doomed to failure only when the animals acquiesced in the pigs' grab for oligarchical 
power. But if the animals had instituted a democratic revolution, or if they had redistributed power 
democratically at the first sign of the pigs' malfeasance (when they took the apples and milk for 
themselves), Orwell said, then the revolution of Animal Farm would have been a success. Letemendia 
(1992: 127) quotes a letter Orwell wrote to Dwight Macdonald explaining the message of Animal 
Farm: such a revolution as occurred “can” – in Orwell's words – only lead to a change of masters” but 
“when the masses are alert and know how to chuck out their leaders as soon as the latter have done 
their job,” and – continued Orwell – “[i]f the other animals had had the sense to put their foot down 
then, it would have been all right.” In other words, Orwell was arguing that a democratic form of 
socialism would have prevented the abuse of power by the ruling pigs.6
6 Furthermore, Letemendia notes (1992: 124) that Orwell was “identif[ying] a flaw in the Marxian 
theory of revolution itself. … By revealing the divisions within the animal ranks, Orwell is 
cautioning his reader to question the animal view of the class struggle.” Old Major had only 
diagnosed the class struggle between animal and man, but he had neglected the class struggle among 
animals. The revolution merely created a new political class as the pigs replaced the ousted humans. 
Cf. Reilly (1986: 75). It seems Orwell had rediscovered the old French Liberal theory of class-
conflict which – predating Marx – had posited a class-conflict between the rulers and the ruled; see 
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It is significant that when T. S. Eliot recommended against the publication of Animal Farm on 
behalf of the publisher Faber & Faber, among Eliot's objections was that “what was needed (someone 
might argue) was not more communism but more public-spirited pigs” (Crick 1980: 38; Reilly 1986: 
80). Such an attitude is the very opposite of Public Choice. As Patrick Reilly astutely notes (1986: 80), 
“Within the terms of Animal Farm this is about as sensible as asking for god-fearing atheists.” What 
Orwell wanted was not to rely on utopian, naïve hopes of better human (pig) nature, but to craft robust 
political institutions that would produce good outcomes despite flaws in human nature. Just as 
revealing as Eliot's misunderstanding of Animal Farm, is the question Daniel Bell (1949: 265) asked 
after reading Nineteen Eighty-Four: “What are the safeguards and the checks? Tradition? Intelligent 
citizenship? Democratic awareness? Participation? Are these enough when power is at stake?” From 
reading Orwell, it seems, Bell learned to ask the quintessential question of Public Choice.
But as we shall shortly see, Richter and Hazlitt assumed away the Public Choice problem of 
incentives and intentions, and argued that even if the socialist planners were wholly public-spirited, 
tyranny would still necessarily result. However, Richter's and Hazlitt's argument rested on certain 
economic premises - Classical School economics in the case of Richter and Austrian School economics 
in the case of Hazlitt (following Mises and Hayek) - which a socialist would reject out-of-hand, as 
Orwell did in his “Review of The Road to Serfdom by F. A. Hayek” (1944a).7
II. Eugen Richter's Pictures of the Socialistic Future
Palmer (2009), Hoppe (1993), Raico (1993, 1974), and Weinburg (1978).
7 For a discussion of Orwell's review (1944a) of Hayek's book (2007 [1944]), see Richman (2011) and 
Epstein (2002: 997-1002). Concerning Orwell's economic views in general, see Roback (1985). On 
the common misunderstanding of Orwell as an anti-socialist, and on Hayek's positive assessment of 
Orwell and his attempt to recruit him to join the Mont Pelerin Society, see Farrant (2015).
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Nineteenth-century German classical liberal (libertarian) parliamentarian Eugen Richter wrote 
his 1891 dystopian fiction, Pictures of the Socialistic Future (Richter 2010), to show how socialism 
would fail even when its planners had the best of intentions.8 Nowhere in the story is the government 
shown to have any ill-intentions. Everything is done in complete sincerity. Nevertheless, a totalitarian 
tyranny results, due to the logic of socialism as an economic system. The novel is thus an exercise in 
reductio ad absurdum. For example, the narrator's son Franz and his fiancée are forced to indefinitely 
delay their upcoming marriage because the government has assigned them to live and work in different 
cities (Richter 2010: 21). After all, if the government is to plan production, it must assign employment 
to everyone, and the government's plans for economic efficiency cannot be spoiled by a marriage that 
might after all be dissolved by divorce at any moment anyway (Richter 2010: 22). And many people 
had to be assigned labor that was contemptible and undesirable to them because, after all, everyone had 
requested only the most pleasant and enjoyable work. Not everyone can be a forest-keeper; somebody 
has to clean the sewers (Richter 2010: 24).9 Most distressingly, the government finally had to ban all 
emigration. For reasons the government's officials honestly could not understand, many people had 
been attempting to leave the country, especially the most skilled and most well-educated. But it could 
not allow the socialistic system to be spoiled by the emigration of the very best and most valuable 
8 Mention of Richter is rare. Knoll (1991: 37), citing Ritter (1960) and Plank (1981: 211), says only 
that Richter's novel was a parody of Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888). Neither Knoll nor Plank 
even cite the title of Richter's novel. (I do not know German so I could not examine Ritter.) The 
brief mention of Richter by Creveld (1999: 220) is almost as laconic. The only sustained, detailed 
discussion of Richter is in Raico (1990).
9 Cotton pointed out that in More's Utopia (1516), people rotate in an out of more desirable and less 
desirable occupations, and the truly onerous work is done by convicts and saints; apparently More 
had realized the allocational dilemma created by the abolition of differential wages.
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people. So finally, the government forbade emigration, posting armed troops along every border 
(Richter 2010: 57-59). And while the socialist government was in fact democratic, it had accidentally 
and unintentionally restricted the freedom of speech. For all printing presses were state-property, and 
the state was responsible for publishing all materials, both political and not. When election-time began 
approaching, people realized that there were no ration coupons for purchasing space to run campaign 
ads (Richter 2010: 93). It had simply never occurred to the government's officials that ration coupons 
needed to exist to purchase not only food and housing but also political ads. Obviously, it was 
impossible to allow everybody to run an advertisement; there wouldn't be enough newspapers in the 
world. But if advertising space is limited, and the government owns all the printing presses, how is it to 
decide who deserves to run an ad? There was no deliberate, orchestrated censorship, but in reality, 
censorship became de facto simply because the government alone owned all the means of 
communication. By the end of the book, Germany has become a totalitarian dictatorship, not because 
anybody has abused his power, but on the contrary, because socialism has been implemented faithfully 
and consistently. The more sincere and well-intentioned the public officials were, the more totalitarian 
and despotic the regime became. The government was still democratic, and everything that the 
government had done had been in sincere pursuit of authentic socialism. As Ralph Raico says of 
Richter's novel,
Sometimes the work even verges on what at first seems absurd, especially in connection 
with the relations of social equality that will supposedly obtain under socialism, e.g., the 
new socialist reich chancellor must shine his own boots and clean his own clothes, in 
Richter's account. The explanation for this, however, is that Richter took the egalitarian 
promises of the socialists too literally, too seriously. He lacked any inkling of Marxism's 
drive to bring to power a new class of privileged higher-echelon state functionaries. 
(Raico 1990: 11)
I would interpret Richter more charitably. It seems to me that Richter probably wished to concede the 
benefit of the doubt to the socialists. He did not wish to make the sort of argument that Orwell later 
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would, that the public officials of a socialist government would be liable to abuse their power. He 
wanted to show that even without such a Public Choice assumption, socialism would necessarily be 
tyrannical. In fact, the more faithfully and sincerely the government put socialism into effect, the more 
tyrannical it would become. A lax and corrupt government might have allowed the economic plan to be 
spoiled for the sake of allowing husband and wife to stay together. But a thoroughgoing socialist could 
not allow this. The government had made a plan for the benefit of all people, and it could not let petty 
and parochially private concerns like romance spoil the welfare of all. The more sincere the socialist 
regime, the more liable it was to become what Isabel Paterson called the “The Humanitarian With the 
Guillotine” (Paterson 1943: 235-250). Thus, Richter's assumption was precisely the opposite of 
Orwell's: Orwell assumed socialism would work if the political institutions prevented the abuse of 
power, whereas Richter argued that socialism would necessarily fail even under the assumption that the 
socialistic government were perfectly democratic and that all its officials sincere and trustworthy.
III. Henry Hazlitt's Time Will Run Back
The case is similar in Henry Hazlitt's reverse-dystopia, Time Will Run Back (1966).10 The entire 
world is governed by one single socialist super-state but things have not gone as the socialists planned. 
The entire world is depicted as living in poverty under political oppression and nobody can figure out 
10 I call it a “reverse-dystopia” because the book begins as a dystopia until “time runs back” and 
capitalism is rediscovered. Citations of Hazlitt are even rarer than mentions of Richter, and neither 
Sargent (1981) nor anybody else seem to mention this novel. But Hazlitt clearly knew of Orwell: 
Hazlitt gives a litany of economists who were his influences (Hazlitt 1966: vi) and he claims that the 
similarity of his novel to Nineteen-Eighty Four (Orwell 1949), Zamiatin's We (1921), and Huxley's 
Brave New World (1932) was owed to the fact that they were all “plagiarizing from the actual 
nightmare created by Lenin, Hitler and Stalin” (Hazlitt 1966: vi-vii).
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why. The socialist dictator, Stalenin, confides to his son, Peter Uldanov, that he had to send his own 
wife, Peter's mother, into exile because she had accused him of betraying the revolution. Stalenin says 
that he sincerely was implementing Marxist-Leninism as best he knew how, and that he had hoped 
before her death to finally produce the paradise which had been promised (Hazlitt 1966: 26, 31).11 
When Peter asks another Party member why there had not been any technological progress in the entire 
century since the revolution, the other member confesses, “That, Comrade Uldanov, is a question I 
have never been able to answer” (Hazlitt 1966: 63). Later, another party member pleads that he cannot 
understand why all the workers are so lazy. They must be compelled to work with force and threats 
because without such incentives, the workers refuse to do much of anything (Hazlitt 1966: 87). The 
Party member is sincerely dumbfounded by the people's intransigence and stubborn refusal to work. 
The Party is truly ingenuous, and cannot understand why the socialist system is not working. And like 
Richter's, Hazlitt's novel tries to show that the tyranny is the consequence of the logic of socialism as 
an economic system, and has nothing to do with any ill-intentions or abuse of power. 
For example, when Peter suggests eliminating every law except those forbidding murder and 
theft and the like, fellow party member Adams points out that with all wages equal, it is impossible to 
get some people to do the more unpleasant tasks without compelling them with violence (Hazlitt 1966: 
116, 119). The laws cannot be confined to punishing self-evidently antisocial acts of aggression or 
violence such as murder and theft. Instead, the majority of the law comes to be constituted by sanctions 
compelling obedience to the central plan even when violation of the plan is not self-evidently criminal 
or antisocial. Not even the slightest deviation from the plan can be tolerated if the central-plan is to be 
effective. By the logical necessities of the system, the law comes to focus less and less on punishing 
11 Of course, Stalenin could be lying. But he was speaking to his own son, whom he later installed into 
power as his successor, so it seems more likely that Stalenin was telling the truth. The simplest 
interpretation is that Stalenin really was trying his best to implement the true Marxist utopia.
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obviously immoral, antisocial trespasses by one person against another. Instead, the law more and more 
imposes sanctions to compel obedience to the economic plan. In legal terms, the acts prohibited by law 
tend to be less often malum in se (“wrong in itself”) and more often malum prohibitum (“wrong 
because prohibited”).12 For example, there cannot be freedom to choose one's own occupation in a 
socialist system if the government is to plan all production, for the government must be able to ensure 
that all the workers are engaged in precisely the industries that the government has predetermined. The 
law must sanction those who refuse to work in the assigned occupation with nearly the same priority 
with which it punishes murder and theft. And even when Peter permitted complete freedom of speech, 
the people kept silent and did not use their new freedom, because the state was their sole employer, and 
they were still afraid to say anything that might upset it (Hazlitt 1966: 128). If something they said got 
them fired, they had nowhere else to turn for a job. And because all means of publication and 
communication were state-owned, none of their managers were courageous enough to publish dissent, 
lest they lose their jobs too (Hazlitt 1966: 133). 
Finally, Peter says to Adams,
You are forcing me to admit that the reign of slavery and terror imposed by my father 
and Bolshekov is not an accident, not some monstrous perversion of the socialist ideal, 
but merely the logical and inevitable outcome of the socialist ideal! You are forcing me 
to admit that complete socialism means complete deprivation of individual liberty and 
an absolute government dictatorship. (Hazlitt 1966: 145f.; emphasis in original)
Thus Hazlitt, like Richter, assumed that the government is altruistic and sincerely wishes to implement 
only the truest, most authentic socialism. And yet tyranny and despotism result as the inexorable 
consequence of the logic of the socialist economic system. Freedom and material prosperity do not 
return to the world until Peter and Adams accidentally reinvent capitalism. Every non-Marxist book 
had previously been systematically wiped from existence by the worldwide socialist regime, and so 
roughly half the novel is composed of detailed Socratic dialogues between Peter and Adams as they 
12 I thank Arthur Sapper for pointing this out.
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slowly rediscover for themselves the basic principles of economics. It is only when the two 
protagonists complete their rediscovery of economics that political liberty and material prosperity make 
themselves known together in the world again.13 Hence the novel's full title, Time Will Run Back: A 
Novel about the Discovery of Capitalism.
So like Richter's novel, Hazlitt's is the mirror-image of Orwell's. Whereas Orwell presaged 
Public Choice and thought any economic system would work if only the political institutions could 
prevent the abuse of power, Richter and Hazlitt assumed the abuse of power away and strove to 
demonstrate that even so, socialism would necessarily turn totalitarian and despotic.
IV. The Problem of Economic Calculation
That this was Hazlitt's intention, is corroborated when we consider the source of Hazlitt's 
inspiration. According to Hazlitt, the inspiration for his novel was “several paragraphs in Ludwig von 
Mises' [sic] Socialism” (Hazlitt 1966: p. vi), and he says that his own novel is about “the problem of 
economic calculation” (Hazlitt 1966: p. viii). This gives us a key to Hazlitt's intent. The essence of 
Mises's position in the so-called “socialist calculation debate” (which Mises inaugurated) was this: 
even if the socialist government were perfectly public-spirited and well-intentioned, socialism would 
still utterly fail because the government would have no idea what to order the people to do. The 
government would have the good intention to issue only orders for the genuine welfare of the people, 
and yet it would have no rational way to know which orders it ought to issue. The government would 
be operating blindly in the dark, despite the best of intentions. As Murray N. Rothbard notes,
Before Ludwig von Mises raised the calculation problem in his celebrated article in 
1920, everyone, socialists and non-socialists alike, had long realized that socialism 
suffered from an incentive problem. . . . The traditional socialist answer held that the 
13 These dialogues are so detailed and thorough that insofar as one agrees with the Austrian School 
views of Hazlitt, the novel could actually be used as an economics textbook.
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socialist society would transform human nature, would purge it of selfishness, and 
remold it to create a New Socialist Man. That new man would be devoid of any selfish, 
or indeed any self-determined, goals. . . .  But the uniqueness and the crucial importance 
of Mises's challenge to socialism is that it was totally unrelated to the well-known 
incentive problem. Mises in effect said: All right, suppose that the socialists have been 
able to create a mighty army of citizens all eager to do the bidding of their masters, the 
socialist planners. What exactly would those planners tell this army to do? . . .  Mises 
demonstrated that, in any economy more complex than the Crusoe or primitive family 
level, the socialist planning board would simply not know what to do, or how to answer 
any of these vital questions. . . .  [T]he planning board would not be able to plan, or to 
make any sort of rational economic decisions. Its decisions would necessarily be 
completely arbitrary and chaotic, and therefore the existence of a socialist planned 
economy is literally “impossible” (to use a term long ridiculed by Mises's critics). 
(Rothbard 1991: 51-3)
Thus, Mises never impugned the motives of the socialist planners, nor did he ever suggest that any of 
them might abuse their power. His entire argument assumed that the socialist planners were completely 
sincere and public-spirited. And yet their system was destined to fail by its own logic. The best of 
intentions cannot make an illogical system function as intended. Mises's argument was thus the 
opposite of that of Public Choice. And as Hazlitt explicitly declared that he was inspired by Mises to 
write his novel, it is appropriate that he appears to have made the same assumptions in his novel as 
Mises had in his technical economic writings. 
The difference between Hazlitt's and Mises's approaches is that while they made the same 
assumption of altruism and trustworthiness by the government, Mises confined himself to showing that 
socialism would lead to anarchy of production, a complete and utter breakdown of any semblance of an 
economy. Hazlitt, by contrast, went beyond Mises and argued that the same problem of economic 
calculation under socialism meant that any attempt to plan the economy in a socialist manner would 
inevitably result in totalitarian tyranny and the denial of freedom regardless of the good intentions of 
the planners, without any abuse of power. David Ramsay Steele too attempted a similar demonstration, 
using the same Misesian problem of economic calculation to show not only that socialism could not 
function economically – that it could not provide material sufficiency - but that it would necessarily be 
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tyrannical as well. According to Steele (1992: 316):
Nothing could be further from the aspirations of Marx and Engels than an oppressive 
state or a meddlesome bureaucracy, but their commitment to society-wide 
comprehensive industrial planning requires that the communist administration be an 
omniscient state. This is not apparent to Marx because of his unawareness of the 
problem of economic calculation.
For Marx, “Such an organizational form” allowing political liberty
can be made to seem compatible with the Marxian insistence on “planned production for 
use” by assuming that the task of planning is child's play, and this in turn must require 
the assumption that most allocative decisions are obvious and undebatable. (Steele 1992: 
316f.)
And again,
One of the reasons why the early Marxists were able to combine (in their imaginations) 
a single great industrial plan with a loosely federated non-authoritative structure is that 
vast areas of decision-making which we can see would have to be put into the plan and 
translated into instructions to subordinates, the Marxists saw as being self-evident and 
hardly requiring any administrative attention. (Steele 1992: 262)
Furthermore,
Marx . . . doesn't envisage the trappings of central-planning, no matter how obvious 
these may seem to us. With his blind spot about the role of the market, Marx 
underestimates the scale of the task facing the communist administration. (Steele 1992:  
270)
Thus, socialism devolves into tyranny – according to these economists – not because anyone abuses 
their power, but because of the inexorable economic logic of the system. It is impossible to centrally 
plan an economy without micromanaging individuals' lives. Even the English socialist Maurice Dobb 
realized this dilemma and despaired of the possibility of maintaining freedom under socialism, saying, 
“Either planning means overriding the autonomy of separate decisions, or it apparently means nothing 
at all” (quoted in Hoff 1981: 267).14
In addition, there is yet another possible economic explanation for the rise of totalitarianism. 
14 For this reason, democratic socialism is incoherent; see Makovi (unpublished).
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This explanation was advanced by neither Richter nor Hazlitt, but instead by Mises (1985, esp. chapter 
3, parts 4-10) and by Gustav Cassel (1934). This Mises-Cassel argument is compatible with the 
Richter-Hazlitt explanation, however. Mises and Cassel focus on international commerce, arguing that 
military aggression is a logical consequence of the socialist pursuit of autarky (economic self-
sufficiency). Foreign trade is a market-based activity antithetical to the ideology and values of 
socialism and therefore ideologically anathema to the socialist state, which is necessarily autarkic 
(Mises 1985, Osterfeld 1992: 7). Furthermore, foreign trade reduces national sovereignty by granting 
economic power to the foreign trading partner (Mises 1985, Osterfeld 1992: 181f.). Any changes in 
foreign markets threaten to disrupt the intricate domestic central plan of the socialist state. Therefore, 
under thoroughgoing socialism, foreign trade must be limited if not entirely precluded so that the state 
can plan with confidence.15 But if imports are banned, then the state must conquer those territories that 
possess desired resources (Mises 1985, Cassel 1934).16 Hence, the Nazi pursuit of Lebensraum, “living 
space” to operate. Hence, F. A. Hayek argued in the Road to Serfdom (2007) that German National 
Socialism was not a corruption or departure from socialism, but instead, its logical conclusion, which 
the Nazis had simply taken it to.17 According to Hayek, the Nazis had simply been more willing than 
the German Social Democrats to use whatever means necessary to implement socialism, including 
15 Even mere economic interventionism in domestic markets - which falls short of socialism - requires 
restrictionist trade barriers to prevent foreign competition from spoiling the plans of the government. 
For example, if a state wishes to boost domestic wages in a given industry by unionism or minimum 
wages, then it must establish trade barriers to keep foreign nations from undercutting those wages by 
offering cheaper goods.
16 Hints at a similar analysis are offered by John Jewkes (1968: 111, 218, 223, 234, 236).
17 Schivelbusch (2006) instead shows the many parallels between German National-Socialism and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, but this still tends to confirm Nazism's socialist bona fides.
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warfare (Hayek 2007: 146, 160, 182).18 We can summarize the Mises-Cassel argument with Manchester 
School's observation that “Where goods do not cross borders, armies will.” Restriction of foreign trade 
leads to war, and Nazi/Soviet military expansionism was merely a logical requirement of socialist 
economic policy. Of course, domestic totalitarianism is more than military expansionism, so we still 
need Richter and Hazlitt to explain why socialism leads to domestic totalitarianism. But Mises and 
Cassel contribute to the Richter-Hazlitt argument that the behavior of totalitarian states was dictated by 
the rational pursuit of economic incentives, not irrational, depraved sadism.
In addition, Richter's and Hazlitt's claim that socialism requires conscription of labor deserves 
particular comment. Their claim may appear outlandish but in fact, in 1947, the British Labour 
government renewed its wartime requisitioning powers by enacting the Control of Engagements Order 
which empowered the government to conscript labor for essential industries. As Hayek noted in his 
1956 preface to the American edition of the Road to Serfdom (Hayek 2007: 47), “There is no better 
illustration of the manner in which the inherent logic of their policies drove an unwilling socialist 
government into the kind of coercion it disliked.”19 Incredibly, even Orwell himself seems to have 
eventually realized that socialism necessarily requires forced labor. What is distressing, however, is that 
Orwell did not seem to make any serious moral objection to this. In Orwell's final edition of “London 
Letters” in the Partisan Review (11:3, summer 1946), Orwell argued (to quote Newsinger 1999: 139; 
cf. Farrant 2015: 161),
that in conditions of full employment if wages are evened out, workers will drift away 
18 Hayek approvingly cites both Cassel and Mises (Hayek 2007: 239f.).
19 In a 1994 preface to the Road to Serfdom, Milton Friedman agreed that this law confirmed Hayek 
(see Hayek 2007: 261). John Jewkes (1968: 89f., 191, 193) also called attention to this law. For a 
detailed summary and analysis of this law, see Farrant (2015). For general discussion of why 
socialism logically requires labor-conscription, see Makovi (unpublished).
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from the more disagreeable jobs . . . Quite incredibly, he [Orwell] argued that socialists 
had to face up to the fact that “you had to make use of forced labour for the dirtier kinds 
of work.”
Not long before, in July 1945, Orwell had similarly stated in the Partisan Review that Britain “will be 
obliged to both coerce the miners” and that “post-war reconstruction . . . [would require] 'direction' of 
labour over a long period” (quoted in Farrant 2015: 176 n. 43). It is difficult to determine how 
democratic socialism could successfully prevent socialism from turning tyrannical, if any form of 
socialism requires compulsory labor (Makovi, unpublished). But the important point for us now is that 
when Richter and Hazlitt predicted conscription of labor under socialism, they were not making 
fantastic claims outside the realm of reason.
Orwell does not appear to have known much economics, and whatever he did know inclined 
him away from, not towards free-market capitalism (Makovi 2015; Roback 1985). So unlike Richter, 
Hazlitt, and Steele, he could not have predicted for economic reasons that socialism would be 
tyrannical. Indeed, in his column “As I Please 63” in 1946, Orwell explicitly stated of the totalitarians 
that, “It is not easy to find a direct economic explanation of the behaviour of the people who now rule 
the world” (Orwell 1946a: 1137). In Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell 1949), Winston struggles with this 
question, saying, “I understand HOW: I do not understand WHY” (quoted in Howe 1956: 331; 
Deutscher 1956: 129; cf. Spender 1965: 70). While Winston is being tortured by O'Brien, Winston 
offers the answer of Dostoyevski's Grand Inquisitor and Zamiatin's Benefactor in We: that totalitarian 
despots abuse their power benevolently for their victims' good, paternally forcing their victims to 
exchange freedom for security (Howe 1956: 330f.; Howe 1983: 101; Rahv 1949: 17f.; Trilling 1949: 
25; Patai 1984: 48). Winston suggests to O'Brien
That the Party did not seek power for its own ends, but only for the good of the majority. 
That it sought power because men in the mass were frail, cowardly creatures who could 
not endure liberty or face the truth, and must be ruled over and systematically deceived 
by others stronger than themselves. . . . That the choice for mankind lay between 
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freedom and happiness, and that, for the great bulk of mankind, happiness was better. 
That the Party was the eternal guardian of the weak, a dedicated sect doing evil that 
good might come, sacrificing its own happiness to that of others. (quoted in Howe 1983: 
101 and Spender 1965: 70)
But O'Brien dismisses Winston's explanation as ridiculous, chastising him and explaining,
The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of the 
others; we are interested solely in power. . . . Power is not a means, it is an end. One 
does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the 
revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. 
The object of terrorism is terrorism. The object of oppression is oppression. The object 
of torture is torture. The object of murder is murder. The object of power is power. Now 
do you begin to understand me? (quoted in Howe 1956: 330; Howe 1983: 102; Rahv 
1949: 17; Deutscher 1956: 125; Calder 1968: 148; Spender 1965: 70.)
Orwell could not understand the totalitarian impulse as anything but a raw lust for power for its own 
sake. 
Orwell's diagnosis is perhaps rather dubious, however. It may be true, as Lord Acton said, that 
power corrupts, and absolute power absolutely. But except in the case of sado-masochists and 
psychopaths, surely political power is more often sought in an economically rational fashion as a means 
to an end rather than as an end unto itself (Burgess 1978: 43). Hence, Isaac Deutscher (1956) argues 
that O'Brien's motive in Nineteen Eighty-Four is absurd, and he criticizes Orwell for degenerating to 
adopting a “mysticism of cruelty.” George Kateb (1966: 74f., 87) agrees with Deutscher that O'Brien's 
motive cannot be taken seriously as realistic. On the other hand, Philip Rahv (1949) and Isaac Spender 
(1965: 70) defend Orwell's exposition of O'Brien's motive as reasonable, and Richard Epstein (2002: 
1003-1007) believes Orwell successfully penetrated the psychology of a deranged dictator. Alternately, 
Kateb (1966: 84) and Anthony Burgess (1978 45) argue that Nineteen Eighty-Four is a Swiftian satire 
that exaggerates one aspect of human psychology. Similarly, Irving Howe (1957: 324) and Michael 
Harrington (1982: 430f.) compare the power-motive in Nineteen Eighty-Four to an abstract, ideal 
physics model that abstracts away several variables (e.g. air-resistance) to focus on one (e.g. gravity). 
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Indeed, all anti-utopian fiction must exaggerate (Howe 1962). Indeed, Orwell himself (1949) explicitly 
refers to Nineteen Eighty-Four as a satire. Kateb (1966: 85, 87) and Alex Zwerdling (1971: 91, 101) 
suggest Orwell's purpose in satirizing the power-motive: Orwell needed to rouse the emotions and 
passions of his readers. The Soviet myth which had captured the hearts of so many, could be countered 
only by an equally powerful myth. Orwell had to capture the imaginations of his readers even if this 
meant taking some artistic license. The enduring presence of Nineteen Eighty-Four in the popular 
imagination today and its constant mention on the lips of those wary of “big government” today, 
suggests that Orwell succeeded.
But even if we accept O'Brien's sadistic and depraved pursuit of absolute power for its own sake 
as being sufficiently true on some level, the fact remains that Orwell could not offer any logical 
explanation of the pursuit of power as an economically rational pursuit of a means to an end. Orwell 
could only conceive of the pursuit of power as an end unto itself. By contrast, Richter and Hazlitt had 
striven to produce precisely an economic explanation of totalitarianism and tyranny. So Orwell denied 
that there was an economic explanation for totalitarianism, and in fact, Orwell was ignorant of the 
problem of economic calculation in precisely the same way that Steele says Marx was. Orwell naively 
stated in “The Lion and the Unicorn” (1941a) that “In a Socialist economy these [economic] problems 
do not exist. The State simply calculates what goods will be needed and does its best to produce them” 
(Orwell 2002: 316). According to Jennifer Roback,
it is naive to assume, as Orwell seems to have, that planning an economy is a straight-
forward extension of the exercise of planning a family shopping list. . . . Orwell seemed 
to have no appreciation of the magnitude of the coordination problem that the price 
system attempts to solve. (Roback 1985: 131)
Orwell was unaware of the Misesian proof of the impossibility of rational economic calculation under 
socialism. If Steele is correct that Marx predicted freedom under socialism only because he was 
ignorant of economics, then the same should be true of Orwell. The reason that Orwell correctly 
20
foresaw tyranny under socialism despite his ignorance of economics was that he had a keen 
appreciation of the realities of politics. His blindness in one area was compensated by an almost 
unparalleled clarity in the other.
V. A Classroom Exercise
Finally, we will now suggest how educators may easily and effectively convey this thesis to 
students. For a course on economics, Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) and Hazlitt's Time Will 
Run Back (1966) are unfortunately probably too long – each about 300 pages – for students to read 
within the time constraints of the course, given that students will already be busy reading dedicated 
economics texts. Thankfully, however, Animal Farm (Orwell 1945) and Richter's Pictures of the 
Socialistic Future (2010) are far shorter, approximately 100 pages each, depending on the edition. They 
are easy, breezy reads as well, with very simple narratives, and they can probably be read by a student 
in only a few hours. Therefore, an economics teacher could assign his or her students to read Animal 
Farm and Pictures of the Socialistic Future, and then conduct a Socratic seminar on those two novels. 
The teacher should ask the students something like, “According to Orwell and Richter, why did 
socialism fail?” The students should eventually arrive at an answer something along the lines of, 
“According to Orwell, because the pigs abused their power and betrayed the revolution; according to 
Richter, because of inexorable economic necessity.” It should not be difficult for the students to figure 
out the basic gists of the arguments on their own, perhaps with some gentle guidance from the teacher 
leading the Socratic dialogue. Once the students grasp the central ideas, the teacher can proceed to 
explain how these two arguments epitomize the Public Choice and Austrian School criticisms of 
socialism. The teacher may elaborate on the subtle nuances according to the students' capacities and the 
constraints of the course.20
20 For a course dedicated specifically to the economics of socialism, the teacher might add Francis 
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VI. Conclusion
Orwell was a socialist and an anti-capitalist until the end of his life. Animal Farm (Orwell 1945) 
and Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell 1949) were not intended as defenses of capitalism, and Orwell did 
not mean to condemn socialism per se, but only non-democratic, totalitarian forms thereof. He did not 
argue that socialism per se would necessarily fail as an economic system, but that socialism would fail 
if institutions were not crafted to provide those incentive structures that would ensure that men behaved 
as they ought. Orwell believed that a democratic socialism was the solution to the Public Choice 
problem that he perceived (Makovi 2015).
So Orwell took the Public Choice approach and assumed that the economics of socialism were 
sound and he questioned instead the political logic of its implementation. But in so doing, Orwell 
missed the opportunity to take the opposite approach, to assume (for the sake of argument at least) 
political altruism and beneficence on the parts of the socialist government's officials and to examine 
instead the soundness of the socialist economic system itself. That approach would have demonstrated 
why democratic socialism was an inappropriate cure for the Public Choice shortcoming of socialism 
which Orwell had perceived far in advance of many of his fellow socialists. 
As we saw, two novels - Eugen Richter's Pictures of the Socialistic Future (2010) and Henry 
Hazlitt's Time Will Run Back (1966) - attempted to prove that socialism would necessarily turn 
totalitarian even without any abuse of power. Even assuming perfect benevolence by the government's 
officials, the logic of socialism itself as an economic system means that socialism will necessarily turn 
Spufford's recent novel, Red Plenty (2012). Although it is a work of historical fiction, it 
meticulously cites its historical sources, and so David R. Henderson notes (2012-2013: 56) that 
“Were I putting together a syllabus on Soviet economic planning, I would start by just working 
through [Spufford's] footnotes.”
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totalitarian and tyrannical. The problem for Richter and Hazlitt was not the abuse of power but just the 
opposite: the more sincere and thoroughgoing the socialism, the more tyrannical it would become 
despite the political authorities' best intentions.
The aims of Orwell on the one hand, and of Richter and Hazlitt on the other, were thus 
diametrically opposed. Orwell believed that socialism would work given the right political institutions 
to incentivize authorities' behavior and prevent the abuse of power. But Richter and Hazlitt claimed that 
if the government is to centrally plan all production precisely, then it must assign everyone to his 
occupation, and nobody can have any freedom to change his employment. Therefore, socialism must 
result in totalitarianism even where democratic element of democratic socialism (hypothetically) 
successfully prevents the abuse of power. Even if democracy successfully prevents the abuse of power, 
this would do no good if Richter and Hazlitt are correct that the problem is not the abuse of power but 
the inherent logic of the economic system.
Nevertheless, Orwell had perceived at least half the argument against socialism, and we might 
just as well criticize Richter and Hazlitt for failing to make Orwell's Public Choice argument. Each side 
in the debate made one assumption about half the socialist system - either its politics or its economics - 
in order to better study the other half. Each made a valuable contribution by assuming away one half of 
the problem in order to better study the other half. By studying the two schools of thought side-by-side 
- Orwell against Richter and Hazlitt -  we come to a better understanding of what each did. More 
generally, we see how the Public Choice criticism of socialist political institutions is the opposite of the 
Austrian highlighting of the problem of economic calculation under socialism. This thesis suggests a 
simple classroom exercise – a Socratic dialogue – that will allow students to realize on their own the 
distinction between the Public Choice and Austrian arguments against socialism.
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